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L Introduction
In describing to the jurors of a capital trial the type of analysis that the law
requires them to use during sentencing deliberations, one prosecutor stated:
Why do we have the death penalty? The reason we have the death
penalty.., comes down to one basic thing. Whose life is more important
to you? Whose life has more value? The Defendant's or [the victim's]?'
Is this the type of analysis that the law requires jurors to use? Most likely, it is
not.2 Arguments of this nature, known as "comparative value arguments,"3 are
widely used by prosecutors throughout the United States. These arguments
have been described as the most effective tool a prosecutor has to obtain a death
verdict.4 It is uncertain, however, whether these arguments are constitutionally
permissible.
This Note examines the constitutional validity of these arguments, which
remains unaddressed in most capital sentencing jurisdictions. Part II begins
with a discussion of a change in the legal landscape that eventually led to the
use of comparative value arguments-namely, the Supreme Court's decision to
permit presentation of victim impact evidence.5 Part II also discusses the
aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision and describes and defines as one of
6its results the use of comparative value arguments. Part Ill explores the
constitutional duties of prosecutors, including the duty to refrain from
arguments that mislead jurors on the law.7 This limitation on the powers of
1. State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. 1995).
2. See infra Part IV (arguing that comparative value arguments mislead jurors on the
analysis that the law requires them to use during capital sentencing deliberations).
3. For detailed treatment of this phrase, see infra Part II.C (discussing comparative value
arguments).
4. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 246 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the trial court judge, who stated that the comparative value argument in
question was one of the best arguments he had ever heard, "in terms of... effectiveness").
5. See infra Part I.A (discussing the rise of victim impact evidence as an admissible
category of evidence).
6. See infra Part 11.B (describing the effects of the Supreme Court's decision to permit
the presentation of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing trials).
7. See infra Part IH (discussing prosecutors and their duties).
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prosecutors is discussed in relation to precedent under both the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clauses. 8 Part IV argues that comparative
value arguments mislead jurors in several ways, thereby violating both
constitutional doctrines.9 Finally, this Note concludes that, in the event a
challenge to the use of comparative value arguments reaches the Supreme
Court, the Court should hold these arguments unconstitutional. 0
II. The Rise of Comparative Value Arguments
To understand the significance of comparative value arguments, some
context is necessary. Comparative value arguments have emerged as one of the
uses of victim impact evidence." Victim impact evidence is evidence that is
said to inform the capital sentencing jury of the victim's "uniqueness as an
individual human being."12 This evidence is presented to inform jurors of the
full impact of the crime on the victim, the victim's loved ones, and the victim's
community.1 3 This Part discusses the development of victim impact evidence,
the push for its admission into criminal trials, its limitations, and its uses.
Then, this Part explores at length one of its evolved uses-comparative value
arguments.
A. The Development of Victim Impact Evidence
The push for the admission of victim impact evidence into criminal trials
originated within the victims' rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s.14 This
8. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing various arguments that violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
9. See infra Part IV (arguing that comparative value arguments are unconstitutional
because by using these arguments prosecutors mislead jurors in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clauses).
10. See infra Part V (concluding that comparative value arguments are unconstitutional).
11. See infra Part II.B (noting that prosecutors use this evidence to make comparative
value arguments).
12. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,823 (1991) (describing victim impact evidence as
indicative of the victim's "uniqueness").
13. See id. at 825 (describing victim impact evidence as demonstrative of the total harm
suffered by the victim, the victim's family, and society).
14. See JENNIFER CULBERT, The Sacred Name of Pain: The Role of Victim Impact in
Death Penalty Sentencing Decisions, in PAIN, DEATH, AND THE LAW 111 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2004) (describing victim impact evidence as resulting from the victims' rights movement);
Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact
Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 143, 144 (1999) (describing victim impact
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movement formed "based on the idea that the criminal justice system has
generally ignored the needs and interests of victims of crime and should
become more responsive to these concerns."15 Numerous nationwide victims'
rights groups formed to further this goal. 16 They lobbied for an "increased role
for crime victims in the criminal justice process,"'17 and were largely
successful.18 The admission of victim impact evidence into criminal trials is
described as the most "prominent and controversial" change to occur as a result
of the victims' rights movement. 19
The admission of victim impact evidence into criminal trials only recently
gained the Supreme Court's approval. 20  This approval represents a major
change in the Supreme Court's treatment of this evidence. In 1987, the Court
first addressed the constitutionality of victim impact evidence in Booth v.
Maryland,2' holding introduction of this evidence into capital sentencing
evidence as directly linked to the victims' rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s).
15. CULBERT, supra note 14, at 111.
16. See id. (noting the formation of the National Organization for Victim Assistance
(NOVA), the National Victim Center, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Society's
League Against Molesters (SLAM), the Victims' Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR), and
Parents of Murdered Children).
17. Logan, supra note 14, at 144.
18. See CULBERT, supra note 14, at 111 (describing the movement as succeeding in both
state and federal legislatures); Logan, supra note 14, at 144 (describing as one success of the
movement, the "significantly greater involvement in actual prosecutions" by victims and their
families).
19. See Logan, supra note 14, at 145 (describing the significance of the Court's decision
to permit presentation of victim impact evidence).
20. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30 (1991) (holding the admission of
victim impact evidence constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and overturning two prior
Court decisions that held otherwise).
21. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). In Booth, the Court considered the validity
of the presentation of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
Id. at 501-02. The Court held that this information is "irrelevant to a capital sentencing
decision," thereby creating the risk of arbitrary sentencing. Id. at 502-03. This evidence is
irrelevant because a sentencing jury "is required to focus on the defendant as a uniquely
individual human bein[g]" while victim impact evidence focuses on the victim. Id. at 504.
Evidence related to the victim's uniqueness "may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of
a particular defendant." Id. at 504. This result occurs because the "defendant often will not
know the victim" or the "characteristics of the victim's family" or "whether the murder will have
an effect on anyone other than the person murdered." Id. at 504. The Court feared that jury
consideration of this evidence could result in imposition of the death sentence "because of
factors about which the defendant was unaware." Id. at 505. The Court also expressed concerns
about the potential negative effects that this evidence could have on the justice obtained by
certain victims. Id. at 505-07. Not all victims leave behind an articulate family or even any
family at all to describe the harm that they suffer. Id. at 505. That the "imposition of the death
sentence may turn on such distinctions," stated the Court, "illustrates the danger of allowing
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hearings unconstitutional. Two years later the Court reinforced its position,
holding both evidentiary presentations and related prosecutorial arguments
unconstitutional.23 It is important to note, however, that both decisions resulted
from 5-4 splits. 24 In 1991, the Court overturned these earlier decisions in
Payne v. Tennessee.25 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment erects no per
se bar to the admission of victim impact evidence into capital sentencing
hearings.26 States may permit prosecutors to present evidence of the victim's
uniqueness to inform sentencing jurors of the "specific harm caused by the
defendant., 27 The only limitation Payne placed upon presentation of this
evidence is a Due Process Clause prohibition on any evidence that is "so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. ' 28 After Payne,
juries to consider this information." Id. Additionally, the Court feared that during prosecutions
of crimes committed against victims who are not "sterling member(s] of the community,"
defense attorneys might engage in mini-trials on the victim's character. Id. at 506-07. The
Court found this possibility "simply unappealing." Id. at 507.
22. Id. at 509 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits presentation of victim impact
evidence during sentencing).
23. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12 (1989) (holding unconstitutional
any arguments by prosecutors that use victim impact evidence).
24. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515-19 (dissenting opinion of Justice White, with whom Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia joined); id. at 519-21 (dissenting
opinion of Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice O'Connor
joined); Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812-23 (dissenting opinions by Justice Scalia and Justice
O'Connor, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined).
25. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Payne, the Court reconsidered its
position on the admissibility of victim impact evidence in criminal trials. Id. at 817-27.
Overruling Booth and Gathers, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar
to the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial arguments upon it. Id. at 827.
The Court recognized the long standing requirement that capital sentencing juries must give
defendants "individualized consideration." Id. at 822. The Court held that Booth misinterpreted
this requirement. Id. Booth banned victim impact evidence under the mistaken belief that any
evidence unrelated to the defendant must be excluded. Id. Instead, held the Court, this
requirement only means that this evidence cannot be excluded. Id. The admission of evidence
related to victims does not violate this principle. Id. To protect defendants from impermissible
uses of this evidence, the Court stated that "in the event that evidence is introduced that is so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief." Id. at 825 (citing Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986)).
26. See id. at 827 (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not bar admission of victim
impact evidence).
27. See id. at 825 (holding that the state has a "legitimate interest" in counteracting the
mitigating evidence with evidence of the "specific harm caused by the defendant").
28. See id.
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the admission of victim impact evidence became-and remains-
constitutionally valid.29
B. The "Impact" of Victim Impact Evidence on Capital Sentencing
Payne had an enormous effect on sentencing within capital punishment
jurisdictions. The majority of these jurisdictions permit prosecutors to
introduce victim impact evidence. 30  Usually, this evidence is presented
during the penalty phase of capital trials.31 The victim's survivors-known
as collateral victims-inform the jurors of the victim's personal
characteristics and the harm suffered by the collateral victims as a result of
32the crime. These presentations and arguments based upon them are
considered the best tool a prosecutor has to obtain a death verdict.33
A review of the permitted uses of victim impact evidence in capital
punishment jurisdictions reveals great diversity. 34 Jurisdictions vary as to the
procedural protections afforded to defendants concerning use of this
evidence.35 Jurisdictions differ in their classification of the individuals who
qualify as collateral victims36 and the number of collateral victims permitted
29. See John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases,
88 CORNELL L. REv. 257, 278 (2003) (noting that "Payne is not going away").
30. See id. at 268 (noting that "thirty-three states allow [victim impact evidence] ... and
five states have yet to rule on the admissibility of [victim impact evidence]").
31. See Logan, supra note 14, at 172 (stating that most jurisdictions only permit
presentation of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of capital trials but that some
jurisdictions approve of guilt phase presentations as well, and arguing that use during the guilt
phase seems to contradict Payne).
32. See id. (describing the role of collateral victims during sentencing proceedings).
33. See id. at 177-78 (describing victim impact evidence as "the most compelling
evidence available to the State" and noting that it comes "at the precise time when the balance is
at its most delicate and the stakes are highest-when jurors are poised to make the visceral
decision of whether the offender lives or dies-after the defendant has been convicted of the
most horrendous crime possible").
34. See Blume, supra note 29, at 268-78 (describing significant differences in the types of
evidence that states permit and variation in the procedural protections available to defendants).
35. See Logan, supra note 14, at 174-78 (noting that only eight of the thirty-three states
that use victim impact evidence require some form of notice to defendants by prosecutors of the
prosecutors' intent to use victim impact evidence, that only five of the thirty-three states require
a pretrial admissibility hearing to determine the admissibility of the victim impact evidence, that
only a handful of states require trial judges to give sentencing juries limiting instructions on the
evidentiary purpose of victim impact evidence, and further noting that the procedural
requirements with which federal prosecutors must comply in order to use victim impact
evidence in federal death penalty prosecutions vary per district and circuit).
36. See id. at 154-56 (stating that a few states limit the scope of witnesses to family
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to testify. 37  Jurisdictions disagree over the types of evidence that are
admissible as demonstrative of the "victim's uniqueness" or the "impact on the
victim's family. 3 8 Jurisdictions also disagree about the categories of evidence
they permit to be admitted beyond these two traditional categories. 39 Lastly,
jurisdictions vary as to the permitted purposes for using this evidence 4 and
how juries may use it during deliberation.41
Immediately following Payne, scholars and judges began expressing
concerns regarding the potential effects of this decision on due process rights.
Critics of Payne feared nearly limitless uses of victim impact evidence.42
Further, scholars believe the decision will encourage capital sentencing juries to
consider factors that have long been held arbitrary and irrelevant to sentencing
members, whereas in the majority of jurisdictions the scope is so broad that it includes friends,
neighbors, co-workers, and in the cases of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, even "paid
emergency rescue workers and police").
37. See id. at 155 (noting that the number of witnesses permitted to testify is a matter of
judicial discretion in both state and federal trials, and stating that an example of the high side is
the federal prosecutions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols-fifty-five collateral victims
testified).
38. See id. at 269-72 (describing the broad range of evidence admitted to show the
victim's uniqueness as including evidence about the "victim's good character... talents,
intelligence, spirituality, work ethic.., educational background, standing in the community,
and numerous other traits," and listing the range of evidence showing the impact of the
homicide on the victim's family as including evidence of resulting health complications and
emotional and financial problems and noting that this evidence has been presented in the form
of "poems, videotapes, pre-death photographs and handcrafted items").
39. See Blume, supra note 29, at 271-73 (stating that some jurisdictions permit
presentation of evidence of the harm to the "larger community" and that even against Payne's
holding, three states permit the victims to state their opinions on the appropriate sentence for the
defendant); Logan, supra note 14, at 166 (describing the unconstitutional, yet admitted opinion
evidence as divided into two categories, "characterizations and opinions about the crime and the
defendant, and ... witnesses' opinions as to the appropriate sentence").
40. See Logan, supra note 14, at 169 (describing the purposes served by admission of
victim impact evidence as spanning from evidence used "to rebut mitigation evidence," "to
evaluate the specific harm caused by the murder," and more generally, to show the "victim's
uniqueness").
41. See id. at 170-72 (stating that most jurisdictions ban jurors from using victim impact
evidence as a statutory aggravating factor, but noting that these jurisdictions do not give jurors
any useful guidance on their consideration of it, and that some jurisdictions even permit jurors
to use it as a non-statutory aggravating factor).
42. See Blume, supra note 29, at 268 (stating that the trend in the use of victim impact
evidence is towards "the unfettered admission of a wide array of [it] and arguments" upon it
because few jurisdictions provide any substantive or procedural limitations upon its uses);
Logan, supra note 14, at 145 (describing the uses of victim impact evidence and noting that
there is "precious little in the way of substantive limits, procedural controls, or guidance in how
it is to be used").
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decisions: rage and hatred,43 the inequalities between the defendant's and the
jurors' backgrounds," and race.45 Moreover, many expressed concern that the
use of victim impact evidence will encourage jurors to make capital sentencing
decisions based on their assessment of the defendant's and victim's
comparative societal values.46
C. Comparative Value Arguments as a Use of Victim Impact Evidence
As predicted by scholars, comparative value arguments have developed as
one of the ways in which prosecutors use victim impact evidence.47 The phrase
"comparative value" is a term of art. There are two types of comparative value
arguments: comparative life and comparative worth. This section discusses the
development of these arguments and the differences between them. The
distinction between these two types of arguments is not always clear.48 At
43. See Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim Impact
Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545, 545 (stating that the admission of this evidence inflames
the jurors by invoking "emotions toward the defendant like rage, hatred").
44. See id. (noting that this evidence will "exacerbate existing inequalities in the jury's
attitudes toward the parties... on the fact that the defendant generally comes from a very
different background from the jury' s").
45. See State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 203 (N.J. 1996) (Handler, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[v]ictim-impact evidence will be the Trojan horse that will bring into every
capital prosecution a particularly virulent and volatile form of discrimination... discrimination
based on the victim's race"); Blume, supra note 29, at 280 (concluding that victim impact
evidence will interject racial discrimination in the jury's life or death decision).
46. See Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 203 (Handler, J., dissenting) (noting that the admission
of victim impact evidence "encourages jurors to examine and use, both consciously and
unconsciously, the comparative worth of the defendant and the victim") (emphasis added);
Blume, supra note 29, at 279 (stating that victim impact evidence "can only invite the type of
'comparative worth considerations' dismissed by the Payne majority") (emphasis added);
Logan, supra note 14, at 157-58 (noting concern that "capital jurors, privy to a stream of
witaesses extolling the virtues of the victim, will be tempted to weigh the relative worth of the
victim against the defendant") (emphasis added); Bandes, supra note 43, at 545-46 (stating that
victim impact evidence "encourage[s] irrelevant or invidious distinctions about the comparative
worth of different victims, based on the social position, articulateness, and race of the victims
and their families") (emphasis added); Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering: A Personal
Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 46 (1992) (describing
potential uses of victim impact evidence as "inviting jurors to make... comparative
judgments ... between the victim and the defendant") (emphasis added).
47. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing a
comparative life argument as "the use to which the 'victim impact' evidence was put in this
case").
48. See Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335,340-41 (S.C. 2004) (stating that a cursory review
of Humphries and Hall would lead a reader to think that these distinct argument styles are the
same); see also Jackson v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 2005 WL 1404939, at *8 (Va.
386
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times, even courts mislabel them.49 In its analysis, this Note generally treats
both arguments the same.5° Therefore, the phrase "comparative value
arguments" will be used as inclusive of both types of arguments, unless
otherwise noted. Any subsequent reference to "comparative life" or
"comparative worth" is used for the purpose of distinguishing one type of
argument from the other.
Comparative life arguments encourage jurors to impose a death sentence
on the grounds that the victim led a better life than the defendant.51 Prosecutors
contrast the ways in which the defendant and victim lived their lives at identical
52points in time. This contrast is intended to show that "at the very instant one
life was being put to worthwhile use, the other was not. 53 Comparative life
arguments are the subtler of the two comparison arguments.54 Prosecutors do
2005) (holding a comparative worth argument proper under the Fourth Circuit's Humphries
rationale, yet failing to notice that the argument at issue in Humphries is a comparative life
argument).
49. Applying the analysis outlined in this Note, one could conclude that Humphries is a
comparative life argument. But see Humphries, 366 F.3d at 272 (describing the argument in this
case as one of "comparative worth") (emphasis added).
50. The author recognizes that some courts consider comparative life arguments less
prejudicial than comparative worth arguments and that these courts treat the arguments
differently for analysis. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 222-23 (4th Cir. 2005)
(stating that comparative life arguments are less prejudicial than comparative worth arguments);
Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (holding comparative worth arguments unconstitutional because of their
highly prejudicial nature, yet permitting the less prejudicial comparative life arguments). The
arguments, however, are nearly indistinguishable to most. See id. (noting the fine line between
these two types of arguments). Further, by permitting comparative life arguments and banning
comparative worth arguments, courts give prosecutors an impermissible incentive. Prosecutors
are permitted to present unlimited comparative biographies as long as they do not mention
values or worth. See Humphries, 397 F.3d at 239 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (noting the
prosecutor's lengthy comparative biography argument and criticizing the majority, because
under their holding, prosecutors may encourage worth comparisons so long as they avoid using
words such as "compare" or "value" or "worth"). Yet these arguments are highly prejudicial
because they, too, invite worth comparisons. See id. at 244 (describing the comparative life
argument at issue as urging death by "weighing.. . relative worth of a human"). Thus, because
the two types of comparative value arguments are practically indistinguishable and yet both are
highly prejudicial, the author will treat them the same for analytical purposes.
51. See Humphries, 397 F.3d at 239 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (describing the
prosecutor's argument as "hammer[ing] home" the point that the defendant "had led a worthless
life, [the victim] a worthy one, and a death sentence was warranted on this basis").
52. See id. at 238 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (describing comparative life arguments as
"point-by-point, side-by-side, and year-by-year" comparisons between the lives of the victim
and the defendant).
53. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 222-23 (stating that comparative life arguments are less prejudicial than
comparative worth).
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not explicitly urge jurors to assign a value or a weight to the lives of the victim
and defendant.' 5 Instead, it is the point-by-point manner in which the evidence
is presented-and the lack of guidance to the jurors as to its proper use-that
results in jurors making their sentencing decision at least in part on value
56comparisons. For example, one prosecutor argued the following:
[In 1984 [the victim] met Pat, and they fell in love, and they got married.
That's the same year [defendant] committed two house break-ins at age
13.... Then in 1988, July the 4th, [the victim and his wife] have a little
baby girl named Ashley.... That's the same year [defendant] went to jail
for two years.... [W]hen you look at the character of this Defendant, and
when you look at [the victim], how profane when you look at all the
circumstances of this crime and of this Defendant, how profane to give this
man a gift of life under these circumstances.
57
The prosecutor did not explicitly advise the jurors to compare the two lives and
render a death sentence if the jurors found the defendant's life less valuable.58
Yet, as noted by some appellate judges, it is conceivable that the jurors did
precisely that.59  These arguments are an extremely effective tool for
prosecutors to obtain a death verdict.6° In fact, as one trial judge stated, the
closing argument made by a prosecutor, which included a comparative life
argument, was "one of the best arguments I have ever heard in my life... in
terms of [its]... effectiveness.
'" 61
55. See Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335,340-41 (S.C. 2004) (distinguishing comparative
life arguments from comparative worth arguments on the grounds that comparative worth
arguments assign values to the lives of the defendant and victim, whereas comparative life
arguments do not).
56. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 238 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that even though prosecutors do not expressly use words such as "worth" or
"value," comparative life arguments are so persuasive that they create an impermissible risk that
jurors engage in comparative value balancing).
57. Id. at 213-14.
58. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 340-41 (discussing the difference between Humphries, a
comparative life argument, and Hall, a comparative worth argument, noting that the difference is
that the prosecutor in Humphries did not urge the jury to balance the comparative worth of their
lives, whereas the prosecutor did in Hall).
59. See Humphries, 397 F.3d at 230 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (stating that the "point-by-
point" nature of comparative life arguments makes these arguments just as persuasive as
arguments that explicitly urge jurors to compare worth and noting that these arguments are quite
effective with the jurors). Cf. State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180-81 (N.J. 1996) (holding
comparative life arguments unconstitutional because jurors might misuse victim impact
evidence in a manner that renders trials fundamentally unfair).
60. See Humphries, 397 F.3d at 246 (noting the effectiveness of these arguments).
61. Id. (quoting the state trial judge who presided over defendant Humphries' capital
trial).
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Comparative worth arguments are slightly different. Like comparative life
arguments, prosecutors usually present the victims' and the defendants'
personal qualities in a comparative manner. Prosecutors do not, however, stop
there. 62 They explicitly encourage jurors to assign a weight or a value to the
lives of the defendant and the victim. 63 If the jurors conclude that the victim's
life is worth more than the defendant's, they are urged to reach a death
verdict.64 For example, one prosecutor asked the jury:
What are the lives of these two [victims] worth? Are they worth at least the
life of a man, the psychopath, this killer who stabs and stabs and kills and
rapes and kidnaps?
6
Further, the evidence admitted usually highlights the defendant's negative
qualities and the victim's positive qualities. 66 Consequently, the jury is
supplied with the information it needs to assign value to the lives of the
defendant and the victim.67 These arguments, too, greatly aid prosecutors in
obtaining death verdicts.68
62. Cf Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 340-41 (S.C. 2004) (describing the prosecutor's
argument as going beyond Humphries, meaning solely the presentation of comparative
biographies).
63. See id. (noting that the prosecutor's argument directed jurors to assign weights to the
defendant's and victim's lives based on the evidence presented); State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d
886,902 (Mo. 1995) (quoting the following part of the prosecutor's argument: "The reason we
have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighs... the right
of the guilty not to die.... Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value?
The Defendant's or the [victim's]?").
64. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (describing the prosecutor's argument as direction to the
jury to use "an arbitrary formula whereby if the jury finds Hall's life worth less than his victims"
they must conclude that death is the appropriate penalty); Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902 (noting
that the prosecutor attempted to "simplify the death sentence" to one basic question: "[w]hose
life has more value?").
65. Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 337.
66. See Logan, supra note 14, at 157-60 (listing the variety of evidence admitted to show
the virtues of the victim and the negative nature of biographical evidence presented about the
defendant and further noting that courts typically do not bar presentation of evidence of the
victim's bad character, which taken altogether, leaves the jury with only positive thoughts of the
life of the victim and negative thoughts of the life of the defendant).
67. See State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 182 (N.J. 2001) (describing the prosecutor's
comparative worth argument as supplying jurors with facts to use to balance the victim's and
defendant's comparative values).
68. See Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004) (stating that by following the
prosecutor's comparative worth formula the "jury could reach no other conclusion than that the
death penalty is justified").
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III. Prosecutors as Servants of the Constitution
This Part addresses the role of prosecutors in the criminal legal system and
the duties the law imposes on them. This Part focuses in depth on the outer
bounds of effective prosecution, namely prosecutorial misconduct. This
discussion outlines several types of arguments impermissible under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
A. The Role of Prosecutors
In the United States criminal legal system, prosecutors fulfill a unique
role69 by serving two honorable purposes. 70  They ensure that those who
commit crimes are prosecuted and convicted.7' In this sense, prosecutors work
to protect society from harm and to enforce its laws.72 Their second purpose is
to ensure that "justice shall be done. '73 In this sense, prosecutors serve as
protectors of the Constitution and all of the rights that it affords criminal
defendants.74 Prosecutors do not serve justice by "tacking as many skins of
69. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing the role of
prosecutors as unique because they are "representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all").
70. See id. at 88 (stating that prosecutors have a "two-fold aim... that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer"); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good
Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 355, 376-77 (2001) (summarizing literature on the roles
of prosecutors and labeling them "administrators of justice, advocates, and officers of the
court"); Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3,6
(1940) (stating that "the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human
kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and
who approaches his task with humility").
71. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (stating that prosecutors "must
prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor").
72. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 649 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(describing this purpose of the prosecutor's role as "vindicat[ing] the right of people as
expressed in the laws").
73. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 (describing justice as an "overriding interest" to which the
prosecutor must be faithful); Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is not Whether You Win or Lose, It
is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for
Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 283, 285 (2001) (describing the prosecutor's duty to serve
justice as including "a duty to seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal
justice," "a duty to take action to correct substantive or procedural inadequacies or injustices,"
and a "duty to make sure the process is fair").
74. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that the prosecutor is a "servant of the law"
meaning prosecutors must "refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction"); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?", 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
TIPPING THE SCALES
victims as possible to the wall," but rather by performing their duties in a
manner consistent with providing "those accused of a crime a fair trial."
75
Scholars and judges have noticed that the dual roles of prosecutors are
conflicting in nature-that there is a tension between diligently and yet fairly
prosecuting defendants.76 Sometimes when these roles collide, the duty to
enforce trumps the duty to serve justice.77 The legal community acknowledges
this fact-that justice is not served at all times.78 At the same time, the legal
community reinforces the directive of the courts-that justice should always
prevail.
As safeguards against improper prosecution, a defendant may raise a
variety of constitutional challenges to the prosecutor's performance. 80 These
safeguards include challenges to improper remarks made by prosecutors during
closing arguments.81 Further, the Supreme Court recognizes that it has an
607, 637 (1999) (noting that as a representative of the sovereign, prosecutors must obey the
client's objectives as "reflected in the constitution and statutes, as well as history and tradition").
75. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 649 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the relationship
between prosecutors and the federal Constitution).
76. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 253 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting
that prosecutors must be careful not to cross the fine line between "fair[ness] and earnestness");
Smith, supra note 70, at 377 (discussing the dual roles of advocate and administrator of justice
and asking "[how does one balance these competing and sometimes inconsistent obligations?");
Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1183 (1998)
(suggesting policies to resolve the internal conflicts between "convicting the guilty and being
fair to defendants").
77. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for not reversing the conviction because without fear of reversal,
prosecutors who are "eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal
spanking"); Green, supra note 74, at 643 (recognizing that the objective of justice might lose to
the objective of enforcement).
78. See Viereck, 318 U.S. at 247-48 (describing the dual roles of the prosecutor and
stating that the prosecutor in the case at hand chose to address the jury with "highly prejudicial"
remarks at the expense of fairness and justice); Smith, supra note 70, at 388-91 (stating that the
overriding self-interest of prosecutors to win a case at times trumps their obligation to seek
justice); Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 73, at 295 (arguing that because prosecutors' promotions
are based upon conviction rates, "prosecutors seek convictions to boost their 'score' rather than
seeking justice").
79. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (directing prosecutors to
serve the "overriding interest" ofjustice before consideration of its secondary interest-vigorous
prosecution).
80. Cf., e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 168 (discussing one of the numerous protections given
to defendants by the Due Process Clause's fair trial standards).
81. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-41 (1985) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment protects defendants from prosecutorial arguments that misinform juries on their
roles in sentencing phase of capital trials); see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects defendants from prosecutors'
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ongoing duty to reevaluate capital sentencing schemes for procedural fairness.82
This duty to review includes examinations of any newly developed argument
techniques that might violate fair trial principles.8 3 The following sections
explore the Court's treatment of arguments by prosecutors that improperly
influence jurors.
B. The Eighth Amendment and the Prohibition on Misleading Juries
The Eighth Amendment prohibits federal and state governments from
inflicting "cruel and unusual punishments' on defendants.8 5 The Amendment
includes protection from punishments that are either physically inhumane 86 or
arbitrarily determined.8 7  Of all available punishments, death is the most
severe. 8 Moreover, it is of a significantly different nature than any other
remarks that are so improper as to render trials fundamentally unfair).
82. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1977) (stating that because society's
views of procedural fairness change over time, re-examining capital-sentencing procedures is
necessary and mandatory).
83. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that "[i]f, in a particular case ... a prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding as
to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 339 (stating that the
Court must review prosecutor's arguments for techniques that might violate the "Eighth
Amendment's heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case").
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 3.
85. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he Eighth
Amendment stands as a shield against those practices and punishments which are either
inherently cruel or which so offend the moral consensus of this society as to be deemed cruel
and unusual") (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[wihile the State has the power to punish, the [cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment) stands to assure that this power be exercised
within the limits of civilized standards").
86. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 258-64 (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reviewing
the history of the Clause and concluding that it protects individuals from punishments which
may be torturous or barbarous and that the determination of which punishments violate it will
vary based upon the evolving standards of decency).
87. See id. at 249 (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing an "unusual" penalty
as one which "is [imposed] arbitrarily or discriminatorily"); id. at 274-75 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting that "the English history of the Clause reveals a particular concern with the
establishment of a safeguard against arbitrary punishments" and later noting that "[tihis
principle has been recognized in our cases").
88. See id. at 287 (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "[n]o other existing
punishment is comparable to death in terms of physical and mental suffering").
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punishment; once carried out, death is final for the defendant. 89 Because of this
finality, the Eighth Amendment imposes a "heightened need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."90
Protection from the arbitrary infliction of death is of the highest importance. 9'
Therefore, Eighth Amendment challenges to capital sentencing determinations
require "a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny."92
One protection defendants have under the Eighth Amendment's
arbitrariness prong is protection against improper arguments by prosecutors.
Defendants may bring Eighth Amendment challenges to arguments made by
prosecutors that mislead jurors on their role, as recognized in Caldwell v.
Mississippi.93 Comments by the prosecutor that minimized the role served by
jurors were "fundamentally at odds with the role that a capital sentencer must
perform. 94 The Eighth Amendment's reliability requirement is violated when
prosecutors make improper arguments that are of such a nature as to infect the
89. See id. at 289-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the "unusual severity of death
is manifested most clearly in its finality" and later distinguishing death from other punishments
on the grounds that only a defendant sentenced to death "has indeed lost the right to have
rights").
90. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985).
91. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) (holding that because of its
finality "there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 277 (per curiam)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the "more significant function of the Clause... is to
protect against the danger of their arbitrary infliction").
92. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329.
93. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). In Caldwell, the Court considered
whether the prosecutor telling the jury that their decision was merely one step in a long
appellate process, rather than their assigned role-decision maker-violated the Eighth
Amendment's protection against arbitrary sentencing. Id. at 325-26. The Court held that this
argument violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 341. The prosecutor's argument, stated the
Court, is neither "accurate [n]or relevant to a valid state penological interest." Id. at 336. The
comment is inaccurate because jurors are to determine the defendant's appropriate sentence, and
leading jurors to believe that it is another body, such as an appellate court that makes the
ultimate decision, is misleading. Id. at 333. The Court recognized that jurors respecting the
gravity of their decision and the importance of their role is an important state penological goal.
Id. at 336. The Court then stated that by downplaying and degrading the role of the jury, the
prosecutor's comment was not only irrelevant to, but in contradiction of this important
penological goal. Id. The Court ruled that a prosecutor's comment that is inaccurate and
irrelevant is improper. Id. at 340. Improper comments are an Eighth Amendment violation if
they create a fundamentally unfair sentencing procedure because the Amendment's need for
heightened reliability in death sentences is not met. Id. Because the Court could not say that
the prosecutor's improper argument had no effect on the jury's decision to impose the death
penalty, the Court held that the reliability standard of the Eighth Amendment had been violated.
Id.
94. Id. at 336.
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trial with fundamental unfairness. 95 The Court later summarized the elements
of a Caldwell violation as being met when the defendant shows that the
prosecutor's "remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the
jury by local law.
9 6
Defendants have successfully brought Caldwell claims in federal and state
courts challenging a variety of improper arguments by prosecutors. One line of
these cases discusses arguments that lead the jurors to believe that their role in
the criminal sentencing system is different from what the law requires.
Prosecutors cannot lead jurors to believe that their role is "advisory when it is
not, or... that [their] decision will not have effect unless others make the same
decision. 97  Further, a Caldwell violation exists when the prosecutor's
comment is a "technically accurate statement" of the appellate process that,
because few jurors have legal training, might be misinterpreted as a statement
that minimizes their role.9 8 These arguments violate the Eighth Amendment's
reliability requirement.99 The Eighth Amendment requires jurors to deliberate
carefully, 1°° and these arguments encourage quick, thoughtless decisions.10'
Prosecutors cannot use closing arguments to confuse jurors into thinking that
they serve a less important role than the law requires of them.
Another line of Caldwell claims centers on improper comments by
prosecutors that mislead jurors on the law that governs deliberations. For
example, defendants have a constitutional right to presentation and
consideration by the jury of any facts that may mitigate the jury's finding that
95. Id. at 340 (holding that the prosecutor's comment which was uncorrected by the trial
judge "might so affect the fundamental fairness of the sentencing proceeding as to violate the
Eighth Amendment").
96. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994).
97. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1282 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Frye v.
Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 284-86 (Va. 1986) (holding that the prosecutor telling the
jury that their verdict was a recommendation to the judge who "will be the person that fixes
[the] sentence" is misleading, violating Caldwell because according to Virginia law, "it is the
jury's responsibility to 'fix' the punishment").
98. See Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 298 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a technically
accurate statement to the jury about Delaware's judicial review of their decision being automatic
is misleading because jurors are unlikely to be aware of or able to fully understand the
exceptionally narrow standard of appellate review).
99. See, e.g., id. at 298 (holding arguments that mislead jurors on their role to be Eighth
Amendment violations under Caldwell).
100. See, e.g., id. at 299 (stating that the Eighth Amendment requires jurors to keep in
mind the importance of their decision and their role at all times during sentencing deliberations).
101. Cf., e.g., id. (noting that jurors must "continue to feel the weight" of their duties,
otherwise they may not treat their deliberations with the importance that the law requires).
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death is the appropriate punishment.10 2 A Caldwell violation is established if
the prosecutor argues in such a manner as to "foreclose the jury's consideration
of... mitigating evidence" because the jurors are misled on their duty to
consider this evidence. 0 3 Additionally, prosecutors violate Caldwell if their
arguments lead jurors to think that their decision is nothing more than an
affirmation or denial of the prosecutor's carefully made decision.1° 4 Under
these circumstances, the jurors might make a less careful or less serious
decision than the law prescribes.'0 5 Thus, prosecutors cannot confuse jurors on
the sentencing analysis that the law requires them to use.
C. The Due Process Clauses and the Prohibition on Misleading Juries
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
provide additional protection from improper comments. 0 6 These clauses state
that no government shall deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 107 The Court has read these clauses as protecting
the right of all criminal defendants to have a fair trial.10 8  This fair trial
102. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (concluding that "the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death").
103. See Depew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Buchanan v.
Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 277 (1998)) (holding that a prosecutor's argument that undercut the
defendant's mitigation case so significantly, and at times inaccurately, foreclosed the jury's
consideration of mitigating evidence, thereby altering the jury's view of the role assigned to it in
violation of the Eighth Amendment); State v. Neal, 361 N.J. Super. 522, 535-36 (App. Div.
2003) (holding that a prosecutor's remark that the "defendant's calling of character witnesses
was quite shameless" undercut the defendant's mitigation case, which the "prosecutor cannot
do").
104. See Newlon v. Armontrout, 693 F. Supp. 799, 805-06 (W.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 885
F.2d 1328, 1337 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding misleading a series of comments that led the jury to
believe that the prosecutor was the sentencing decision maker, meaning the appropriate person
to balance this case against others and to balance the aggravating factors and mitigating factors,
instead of the jury).
105. Cf Newlon, 693 F. Supp. at 805-06 (noting that sentences rendered under these
circumstances do not reflect careful, thoughtful jury deliberation).
106. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (stating that a prosecutor's
comments may "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process").
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 (applying to the federal government); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (applying to state governments).
108. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (stating that due process requires trials free from
fundamental unfairness).
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protection extends to both the guilt and sentencing phases of capital trials.' 09 In
discussing sentencing schemes, the Court has noted that "[t]he defendant has a
legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the
imposition of sentence." 11° Prosecutors may not make remarks that "so infect[]
the sentencing proceeding as to render [it] fundamentally unfair.""' Should a
prosecutor make such a comment, the "Due Process Clause... provides a
mechanism for relief."'1 2 This Part discusses two types of arguments that
violate due process fairness standards.
First, arguments that confuse jurors on their legal duties or their legal role
violate the Clause. This due process violation closely resembles Caldwell
Eighth Amendment violations; however, courts maintain separate doctrines."13
Under this Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, prosecutors cannot misinform
jurors as to the appropriate body of law they should apply-for example,
biblical law instead of state law. 1 4 These arguments encourage jurors to
impose death on the basis of outside, irrelevant factors, instead of the legal
principles they promised to follow. 115  Further, prosecutors cannot urge
sentencing determinations on the basis of misstatements of the law. One court
found a due process violation because the prosecutor told jurors that they had
no duty to consider mercy, even though state law clearly directs jurors to
109. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi,
494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990)) (holding that the Due Process Clause's protections are available at
both guilt and sentencing phases of capital trials).
110. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
111. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181.
112. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (holding
that prosecutors may not make arguments that are so "unduly prejudicial" that defendants are
denied their guarantee of a fair trial).
113. This due process violation is nearly identical to the Caldwell Eighth Amendment
violations discussed in Part IlI.B, supra. Defendants may challenge these misleading arguments
under either Amendment. See, e.g., Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1371 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding the prosecutor's arguments unconstitutionally misleading under both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments). Most likely, these coextensive yet separate doctrines evolved as a
result of the particular claims raised by appellants. See State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363,411 n.40
(Conn. 2003) (noting that the defendant did not challenge the improper argument made under
any specific state or federal constitutional clause, discussing the potential for claims under the
Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause precedent, and construing the defendant's claim as
one arising under federal due process protections).
114. See Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1366-71 (1lth Cir. 2001) (holding
unconstitutional an argument that encouraged jurors to follow biblical law, which does not
permit mercy towards individuals who kill their parents, instead of state sentencing law).
115. See id. (holding these arguments unconstitutional because they encourage jurors to
make a sentencing decision that is not founded on state sentencing law).
TIPPING THE SCALES
consider it. " 6 This misstatement of the law encouraged the jurors to deliberate
in a manner that deviates from that required by law.T17 Because jurors promise
to deliberate in accordance with law, fair trial protections are violated by any
sentence based on principles that contradict the law."18 Lastly, prosecutors
cannot urge jurors to use facts during deliberations in a manner that is
inconsistent with the law. One court deemed unconstitutional an argument that
enticed jurors to penalize the defendant for prior crimes that by law could not
be counted against him.'19 Arguments like these call for death on the basis of
legally irrelevant factors. 120  The imposition of a death sentence should,
however, reflect only those aggravating factors specified by law. 12 As these
cases demonstrate, prosecutors cannot use closing arguments to confuse jurors
on the type of analysis they are required to use.
There is a second type of improper argument recognized by courts that is
unrelated to Caldwell. Arguments that inflame jurors also violate fundamental
fairness standards.122 Because of the "vital importance" of the decision to
impose death, death verdicts must "appear to be based on reason."
1 23
116. See Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d 1524, 1529-31 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding as
unconstitutionally misleading a prosecutor's argument that denounced mercy as a sentencing
factor, because the law of the state directed jurors to specifically consider mercy); see also
Peterkin v. Horn, 176 F. Supp. 2d 342, 372-73 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that a prosecutor's
comment telling jurors that they "could not apply the concept of mercy" was "excessive and...
overstepped the boundaries into the realm of constitutional error").
117. See, e.g., Presnell, 959 F.2d at 1531 (stating that the law requires jurors to consider
mercy and the prosecutor informed them otherwise).
118. Cf., e.g., id. (holding that defendants are entitled to a sentence made in accordance
with the law).
119. See Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1545-46 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
unconstitutional an argument that urged jurors to settle the score between the defendant and
victims by penalizing the defendant for crimes that state law prohibited jurors from
considering); see also Christy v. Horn, 28 F. Supp. 2d 307, 318 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (stating that a
prosecutor's argument "crossed the line from [permissible oratorical] 'flair' to foul" because the
prosecutor told jurors to return a death verdict if they found one aggravating factor, and
Pennsylvania law directs the jurors to "engage in a weighing process if it finds at least one
aggravating and mitigating factor").
120. Cf., e.g., Lesko, 925 F.2d at 1545-46 (noting that factors that the law prohibits jurors
from considering are irrelevant to sentencing determinations).
121. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing capital sentencing and noting that jurors must
determine that the prosecutor established at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt to impose death).
122. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that inflammatory arguments made by prosecutors are a grounds for Fourteenth Amendment
relief).
123. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,433 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring injudgment)
(reversing the defendant's death sentence because the sentence was not imposed "based on
reason [but] rather.., caprice or emotion").
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Inflammatory arguments, however, encourage death verdicts made on the basis
of a "whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake."' 24 The severity and finality of
death dictates that courts take "extraordinary measures" to protect defendants
from sentencing by passion and prejudice. 125  Moreover, prosecutors
themselves have "a heightened duty to refrain from conduct designed to inflame
the sentencing jury's passions and prejudices." 
26
There are a variety of arguments that courts find inflammatory.
Prosecutors may not scare the jurors into imposing a death verdict. 127 They
cannot encourage jurors to vote for death instead of life because the defendant
might escape prison and harm them if given a life sentence. 28 Arguments like
these improperly "play on the jurors' personal fears and emotions.1 29 Jurors
are likely to impose death as a means of self-preservation rather than as a
statement of the defendant's blameworthiness. 30 Prosecutors may not urge
jurors to deny the defendant mercy in order to give the defendant the same cruel
treatment that the defendant gave the victim. 13 1 Comments of this nature are
124. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the role of courts
in preventing the imposition of death based on passion instead of reason).
126. Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1541 (3d Cir. 1991).
127. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1943) (prohibiting prosecutors
from using scare-tactics during closing arguments because these arguments encourage a verdict
made out of fear or passion, not reason).
128. See Miller v. Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676, 684 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding unconstitutional an
argument that described the defendant as an escape artist who posed a threat to society and later
that the defendant is a "Mad Dog" that should be put to death); Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882,
889 (11 th Cir. 1984) (holding improper a comment by the prosecutor that he would sleep better
with a death conviction because the defendant could not get back "out on the street"); Christy v.
Hom, 28 F. Supp. 2d 307, 318-19 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that an argument that labeled the
defendant as "the Great Manipulator," to whom prison was just a "revolving door," only served
to inflame the jurors).
129. Miller, 65 F.3d at 684 (holding that inflammatory arguments misdirect the focus of
jurors away from the facts and the law to fears and emotions).
130. See Tucker, 724 F.2d at 889 (holding these arguments unconstitutional because they
divert the focus of the jurors during sentencing from the "character of th[e] crime and th[e]
criminal" to "generalized fears" and the Due Process Clause does not tolerate misleading of this
kind); cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (stating that the central question before
jurors during the guilt phase of a capital trial is that of guilt or innocence and prosecutors should
not cause a shift in the jurors' focus from this question).
131. See Lesko, 925 F.2d at 1545 (stating that "the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of
permissible advocacy by imploring the jury to make its death penalty determination in the cruel
and malevolent manner shown by the defendants when they tortured and drowned the
[victims]"); Thomas v. State, 83 P.3d 818, 826 (Nev. 2004) (stating that a prosecutor's comment
was improper because it informed jurors that the "defendant is deserving of the same sympathy
and compassion and mercy that he extended to [the victims]").
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fundamentally unfair because they are "calculated to incite an unreasonable and
retaliatory decision," instead of a decision based on reasoning and the facts.
1 32
Additionally, arguments that go beyond the evidence presented and make
unsubstantiated inferences that might inflame jurors are unconstitutional. 33
These arguments encourage jurors to shift their focus from the facts of the case
to irrelevant and unrelated emotionally charged issues.1 34 They encourage a
decision based on "blood lust" rather than "reasoned deliberation."1 35 Lastly,
some Justices have expressed a concern that, by the very nature of victim
impact evidence, any arguments made upon it risk becoming unconstitutionally
inflammatory. 136 Victim impact evidence is emotionally charged evidence. 137
It is "frequently tearful testimony" that comes straight from the "hearts... of
the survivors."1 38 Jurors might sentence the defendant to death as a passionate
response to the arguments and not a reasoned response to the facts of the
132. See, e.g., Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1545 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding such
arguments unconstitutional because, instead of making a reasoned moral response to the
evidence presented, jurors act on the basis of vengeance and retaliation).
133. See Shum v. Delo, 177 F.3d 662,666-68 (8th Cir. 1999) (Wollman, J., concurring)
(holding unconstitutional an argument that "attempted to link [the defendant] with Charles
Manson" followed by direction to "kill [the defendant] now" because that argument
inappropriately appealed to "blood lust and mob justice rather than ... reasoned deliberation");
Newlon v. Armontrout, 693 F. Supp. 799, 806-08 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd 855 F.2d 1328,1337
(8th Cir. 1989) (holding unconstitutional an argument that "attempted to link petitioner with
Richard Speck, Charles Manson, and the Son of Sam" followed by directions to "kill [the
defendant] before he could harm their own children"); Mays v. State, 571 S.W.2d 429, 430
(Ark. 1978) (holding highly improper a prosecutor's closing argument that included references
to the defendant being a "dope pusher" and friend of convicted felons, when neither comment is
supported by evidence because prosecutors should not include in their closing arguments
"anything except the evidence in the case and legitimately deductible conclusions that may be
made"); Thomas v. State, 83 P.3d 818, 825-26 (Nev. 2004) (holding as inflammatory and as
arguing inferences outside the evidence a remark that encouraged jurors to find death because
"[t]here is no program that we know of that rehabilitates killers").
134. See Shurn, 177 F.3d at 668 (Wollman, J., concurring) (stating that these arguments
improperly encourage jurors to shift the focus of their deliberations from the facts of the case to
irrelevant emotional considerations).
135. See id. at 668-69 (describing the problems with this type of inflammatory argument).
136. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating
that the admission of victim impact evidence and arguments upon it "can of course be so
inflammatory as to risk a verdict impermissibly based on passion, not deliberation"); id. at 856
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that victim impact evidence and arguments upon it "serve[] no
purpose other than to encourage jurors" to render a death verdict "on the basis of their emotions
rather than their reason").
137. See Logan, supra note 14, at 177-78 (discussing the highly emotional nature of victim
impact evidence).
138. See id. (describing the testimony of survivors).
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case. 39 Therefore, in addition to the other forms of improper arguments,
prosecutors may not use closing arguments to encourage an undue emotional
response from the jurors.
IV. Validity of Comparative Value Arguments
This Part begins by outlining the opinions that address comparative value
arguments and their limited holdings. This Part suggests that several
constitutional doctrines-largely unaddressed by those opinions-support a
finding that comparative value arguments are an unconstitutional use of victim
impact evidence.
A. Judicial Treatment of Comparative Value Arguments
Payne lifted the Booth Eighth Amendment per se bar to the admission of
victim impact evidence. 140 Defendants are not, however, precluded from
challenging the prosecutor's specific use of victim impact evidence in their
trials.1 41 Indeed, in her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor reviewed the
142specific use of victim impact evidence challenged in Payne. Noting that
courts must hold prosecutors to Eighth Amendment standards, Justice
O'Connor did not find that the specific use of victim impact evidence in
Payne's sentencing trial violated this Amendment. 143 The Court has not
139. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring) (expressing concern that
arguments based upon victim impact evidence will be so inflammatory as to encourage death on
the basis of passion instead of reasoned deliberation); id. at 856 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that arguments on victim impact evidence will impermissibly cause a shift in the focus
of jurors from reasoning to emotion).
140. See id. at 818-27 (holding admission of the category of evidence known as "victim
impact evidence" permissible under the Eighth Amendment and overturning Booth which held
that "the admissibility of victim impact evidence was not to be determined on a case-by-case
basis, but that such evidence was per se inadmissible").
141. See id. at 818 (distinguishing Payne from Booth on the grounds that Payne permits
case-by-case review of the use of victim impact evidence, whereas Booth bans all uses of it).
142. See id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (determining that the line between
permissible and impermissible uses of victim impact evidence "was not crossed [by the
prosecutor] in this case").
143. See id. at 831-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding that defendants may seek relief
if "in a particular case.., a prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding as to
render it fundamentally unfair").
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granted certiorari since Payne to address the validity of any of the specific uses
of victim impact evidence that have developed.144
One controversial use of victim impact evidence is comparative value
arguments. To date, seven states have addressed the merits of comparative
value arguments briefly, or at least commented on them. 145 Missouri, New
Jersey, South Carolina, and Wisconsin prohibit prosecutors from making at
least one of the comparative value arguments.146 North Carolina, Virginia, and
Texas, however, permit both. 147 These seven courts support their holdings on a
variety of grounds leaving no clear rationale. 48 Further, the constitutional
issues upon which the courts rely are not always clear.
149
In May 2004, a federal circuit addressed a challenge to the use of these
arguments for the first time. In Humphries v. Ozmint,150 a panel of the Fourth
144. See Blume, supra note 29, at 266 (noting that the Court has not granted certiorari to
any post-Payne cases that challenge the prosecutor's use of victim impact evidence).
145. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 238 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the few state supreme courts that have addressed comparative value
arguments).
146. See Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004) (holding comparative worth
arguments unconstitutional); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 179 (N.J. 1996) (holding both
types of comparative value arguments unconstitutional); State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902
(Mo. 1995) (holding comparative worth arguments unconstitutional); State v. Gallion, 654
N.W.2d 446, 454 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (expressing a concern for the use of comparative value
arguments at jury sentencing proceedings as an unconstitutional use of victim impact evidence,
though the death penalty is not available in this jurisdiction).
147. See Jackson v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 2005 WL 1404939, at *8 (Va. 2005)
(denying in a cursory manner a state habeas petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim that the
comparative worth argument made violated fundament fairness standards); State v. Haselden,
577 S.E.2d 594,610 (N.C. 2003) (permitting prosecutors to make comparative worth arguments
such as the one in this case, during which the prosecutor told the jurors "[i]f you let this
murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that his life is worth more
than [the victim's]"); Jackson v. State, 33 S.W.3d 828, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc)
(permitting prosecutors to make comparisons between the worth of the victim and the
defendant).
148. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (holding comparative worth arguments unconstitutional
because they are highly inflammatory and prejudicial and distinguishable from the permissible
uses of victim impact evidence); Haselden, 577 S.E.2d at 610 (permitting the comparative worth
argument in question as a proper use of victim impact evidence); Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902
(stating that the prosecutor's comparative worth arguments misstate the law and improperly use
victim impact evidence); Jackson, 33 S.W.3d at 834 (holding that Payne only prohibits victim-
to-victim comparisons, not victim-to-defendant comparisons).
149. See Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 179 (stating summarily that comparative value
arguments are unconstitutional); Gallion, 654 N.W.2d at 454 (stating that the court recognizes
the problems that these arguments present but not specifying the problems). Furthermore, the
other opinions never explicitly state the amendment(s) upon which the holdings are based.
150. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004). In Humphries, the court
considered the validity of a comparative life argument which "insistently and systematically
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Circuit held that comparative life arguments are an unconstitutional extension
of Payne.'51 The case was reargued en banc and the resulting decision, issued
in February 2005, overturned the panel decision. 152 It is important to note that
it is the procedural posture of the case that is central to the en banc reversal. 153
At the state sentencing trial Humphries did not make a timely objection to the
use of comparative life arguments. 154 Instead, his challenge to the use of these
arguments reached the Fourth Circuit as an appeal from denial of his petition
for federal habeas corpus relief. 55 In his petition, Humphries argued that
comparative life arguments so clearly violate Payne that his state trial attorney's
failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 6 The standard
of review for constitutional claims raised in federal habeas appeals is quite
strict. 57 Petitioners must establish that the state court's ruling on the claim
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law."'158 The Fourth Circuit rejected
contrasted the apparently virtuous and productive life of the victim with Humphries' allegedly
worthless existence." Id. at 270. The court described this argument as "squarely within the
category of prosecutorial conduct that may be so prejudicial that it renders a trial fundamentally
unfair." Id. at 272. The court stated that the "one thing the centerpiece of closing argument
cannot invite is a sentence on the basis that one person is of more intrinsic value than someone
else." Id. at 274. Further, the court held that these arguments do not further punishment goals
because they "ask a jury to decide, not on the character of the crime, not on the consequences of
the crime, not on the criminal record of the perpetrator of the crime, but on some unfettered
evaluation of human worth that works improper prejudice." Id. This due process violation
should have struck the defendant's trial attorney "like a bucket of ice water." Id. at 276. Thus,
the court granted the defendant's habeas relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 276-78.
151. See id. at 269 (granting the defendant's federal habeas relief "because of the use to
which the 'victim impact' evidence was put in this case").
152. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206,215 (4th Cir. 2005) (vacating the prior panel
decision).
153. See id. at 228-29 (noting that Humphries challenged comparative value arguments on
collateral review and distinguishing the high burden for petitioners of collateral review from
petitioners who raise issues directly).
154. See id. at 214 (noting that Humphries' attorney did not object to the comparative life
arguments at trial, instead his attorney first objected to them at a post-trial motion hearing).
155. See id. (discussing the procedural history of this case).
156. See id. at 215 (noting that Humphries attacked his trial court attorney's failure to
object to the use of comparative life arguments as a denial of the right to effective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that these arguments clearly violate Payne).
157. See id. at 228 (noting the high burden that petitioners must meet in order to receive
relief under the federal habeas corpus standard of review).




Humphries's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.159 The majority held that
South Carolina's Supreme Court did not unreasonably interpret Payne in its
decision to deny Humphries's claim.160 Permitting the use of comparative life
arguments, according to the majority opinion, is not such a clear violation of
Payne that this interpretation meets the strict standards for habeas review.161
Thus, the failure to object to these arguments did not deprive Humphries's
sentencing of fundamental fairness.1
62
Humphries does not, however, hold that comparative life arguments are
constitutionally permissible uses of victim impact evidence. 163 Indeed, the
majority stated that the scope of review for direct appeals is much broader than
the scope of review in habeas corpus cases. 164 Addressing the full range of
constitutional issues associated with comparative value arguments, will require
a case in which the defendant objected at trial, lost the objection, and directly
appealed that decision. 165  The limited Humphries holding should not be
considered as indicative of how appellate courts will resolve properly raised
claims. In light of the approaches taken by Humphries and the state supreme
courts, several issues linger as to the constitutional validity of comparative
value arguments. Do these arguments encourage jurors to use victim impact
evidence in a manner that violates the Supreme Court's Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence? Is a defendant's constitutional right to the jury's
consideration of mitigation evidence eviscerated by these arguments? Finally,
do these arguments improperly inflame jurors? The following sections seek to
bring long needed attention to these issues.
159. See id. (affirming the lower court's denial of habeas relief).
160. See id. at 220-23 (holding that the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of
Payne is not unreasonable and that the use of these arguments did not deprive Humphries's
sentencing procedure of fairness).
161. See id. (holding for several reasons that the South Carolina Supreme Court's
interpretation is not an unreasonable interpretation of Payne).
162. See id. at 220 (holding that the prosecutor's comment "did not render Humphries's
sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair").
163. See id. at 225 (noting that this opinion does not address the validity of comparative
value arguments).
164. See id. 225-26 (distinguishing the standards of review for direct versus collateral
appeals and noting that this collateral appeal is limited solely to whether or not the South
Carolina Supreme Court unreasonably applied Payne, an "unmistakably narrow" issue).
165. Cf. id. (distinguishing the range of issues available for collateral appeals instead of
direct appeals).
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B. Comparative Value Arguments as Caldwell Violations
None of the existing decisions that address comparative value arguments
discuss the validity of these arguments under Caldwell.166 To successfully
challenge comparative value arguments under Caldwell, defendants must
establish that (1) the law requires jurors to use a certain type of analysis in
making their sentencing decision, (2) that by making a comparative value
argument the prosecutor encouraged jurors to use different analysis, and
(3) that this urging of jurors to misapply the law infected the trial with
arbitrariness in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 167 This section argues that
defendants can successfully establish comparative value arguments as
violations of Caldwell.
1. The Analysis Required by the Law
The law sets out the legal framework that jurors must use while
deliberating a capital sentence. This framework derives from Supreme Court
precedent and state sentencing statutes. Fundamental to this framework in most
jurisdictions is the delegation to jurors of the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment for the defendant. The sentencing responsibility of
jurors is "truly awesome,"'168 their task, a "serious one., 1 69 The specifics of their
role vary for each jurisdiction as set out in each jurisdiction's capital sentencing
statutes. 170 States may not enforce sentencing statutes that create the risk of
166. Critics might argue that the absence of this analysis is indicative of the weakening of
this doctrine by the Supreme Court in Romano. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994)
(discussing the outer bounds of Caldwell challenges). The author contends, however, that the
district and circuit courts are good indicators of the remaining protections available under
Caldwell, as demonstrated by the relief granted and sustained on appeal in these courts. See
supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (discussing Caldwell relief). Moreover, a parallel
doctrine exists under the Fourteenth Amendment which provides defendants protection from
improper arguments. See supra Part Ill.C (discussing misleading arguments as prohibited by
the Fourteenth Amendment). For the sake of brevity, the analysis of this Note regarding
misleading arguments will proceed solely under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV.B
will analyze comparative value arguments under one additional due process doctrine (for which
there is no corresponding Eighth Amendment doctrine)--the Court's prohibition on
inflammatory arguments.
167. See supra Part III.B (outlining the elements of a Caldwell violation and discussing
several successful claims brought in federal and state courts).
168. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
169. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985).
170. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 69-97 (Richard A. Leiter, 4th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter NATIONAL SURVEY] (summarizing the capital sentencing statutes in every state).
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arbitrary sentencing. To guard against arbitrariness, the Court has
established a few standards that state sentencing procedures must
incorporate.1 72 First, sentencing statutes must provide jurors with standards for
separating the defendants deserving of death from those who are not.1 73 This
requirement is met by having jurors find at least one aggravating circumstance
before imposing a death sentence.' 74  Aggravating factors vary for each
jurisdiction and are specified in each jurisdiction's capital sentencing
statutes.175 Typical aggravating factors include the circumstances of the crime,
the gravity of the crime, and the chances of rehabilitating the defendant.
176
Second, defendants have a constitutional right to presentation of mitigation
evidence and individualized jury consideration of it. 177 Mitigating evidence is
evidence of "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."
178
Jurors must adhere to these specific rules while deliberating. If the
required analysis is simplified, it can be expressed as a balancing test.179 On
the one hand, jurors must find the existence of at least one aggravating factor
beyond a reasonable doubt. 180 If they do find such a factor, then, on the other
171. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978) (noting that post-Furman the Court
insisted that state sentencing procedures not "create a substantial risk that the death penalty will
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner").
172. See id. at 602 (stating that post-Furman the Court has required that States revise their
death penalty statutes to incorporate the Court's standards).
173. See id. at 601 (stating that state sentencing procedures must provide a meaningful way
to distinguish between "the cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)).
174. Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Application ofApprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v.
Arizona to State Death Penalty Proceedings, 110 A.L.R. 5TH 1, 1 (2005) (stating that the
finding of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt protects against arbitrary
sentencing).
175. See NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 170, at 69-97 (listing the capital sentencing
statutes for each state and a description of each state's aggravating factors).
176. See id. (describing the statutory aggravating factors for each state).
177. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding unconstitutional any state
sentencing procedures that preclude jury consideration of mitigating factors).
178. Id. at 604.
179. See Darryl K. Brown et al., An Overview of the American Criminal Jury, 21 ST. LouIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 108 (2002) (describing the capital sentencing role of ajuror as consisting of
weighing "mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances"); 21A AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 969 (1998) (describing, as widespread, the sentencing scheme that requires
jurors to balance aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances).
180. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000) (holding that the Due Process
Clause requires prosecutors to establish beyond a reasonable doubt all necessary elements,
including aggravating factors).
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hand, jurors assess the strength of the mitigation evidence. 181 If thejurors find
that the mitigation evidence outweighs the aggravation evidence, they must
render a life sentence. 182 If the jurors find that the aggravation evidence
outweighs the mitigation evidence, they may impose a death sentence.
2. Comparative Value Analysis
As the decisions addressing comparative value analysis reveal, jurors use a
different balancing test when they use comparative value analysis. They assign
values to the victim's and defendant's lives. 83 These values represent their
respective contributions to society. 184 This Note proceeds on the assumption
that jurors likely add points to a defendant's or victim's value for contributions
to society and likely subtract points for harm caused. 185 Jurors then balance
these two values to determine the defendant's sentence. 186 Thus, this different
balancing test consists of the defendant's value on the one side and the victim's
value on the other.'
87
Through these arguments, prosecutors tell jurors which facts they should
use in assigning value to each side. Jurors are urged to use the aggravation case
and the fact that the defendant is guilty of a crime to set the defendant's
value. 188 Prosecutors urge jurors to decrease the defendant's value because the
181. Cf Brown, supra note 179, at 108 (noting that one of factors weighed is the strength
of the mitigation case).
182. Cf id. (noting that under these circumstances jurors may render a death sentence).
183. Cf State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886,902 (Mo. 1995) (noting that the prosecutor asked
jurors to render their verdict on the basis of "[w]hose life has more value?"). Implicit within
this charge to the jurors is the direction to them to assess the value of the defendant's and
victim's lives. Without making findings on their respective values, jurors could not answer the
question of whose life has more value.
184. Cf State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 182 (N.J. 2001) (discussing hypothetical
comparative value analysis and noting that the values set are relative to the values society
assigns these individuals).
185. Cf id. (describing the victim's contributions to society as value adding criteria and the
defendant's status as a convicted murderer as a value subtracting criterion).
186. See id. (describing comparative value analysis as the "weighing [of] worth," meaning
the weighing of the respective values of the defendant's and victim's lives).
187. Cf Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004) (labeling a comparative worth
argument an "arbitrary formula" consisting of two balanced values: value assigned to the
defendant's life and value assigned to the victim's).
188. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d 266, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2004) (providing a
transcript of the comparative life argument presented by the prosecutor which urged jurors to
assess the defendant's value based upon the aggravating factors of the case, and outlining the
aggravating factors); cf Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 901-02 (excerpting a portion of the comparative
worth argument presented by the prosecutor in which the prosecutor argued that the defendant's
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defendant is a psychopathic killer, 8 9 a rapist, 190 or a torturer. 191 It is likely that
consideration of this one fact results in a near-zero value. Moreover,
prosecutors urge jurors to further decrease the defendant's value for any prior
crimes.'
92
Regarding the other side of the balancing test-the victim's value-
prosecutors instruct jurors to use victim impact evidence alone to set the
victim's value. They present victim impact evidence showing the victim's
good character and contributions to society. 193  Jurors are told to assign
significant weight to the victim's life because the victim was a spouse, 194 a
parent, 195 a businessman, 196 a community leader, 197 an innocent individual,1
98
from a loving family, 199 a high school graduate, 2°° an exemplary citizen,20' a
value is his value as a guilty murderer); State v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594, 610 (N.C. 2003)
(telling jurors to find the defendant less valuable than the victim because the defendant is a
murderer); Hall, 601 S.E. 2d at 337 (including the prosecutor's comparative worth argument
during which the prosecutor urged jurors to assign the defendant his value on the basis that he
committed an aggravated murder).
189. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 337 (labeling the defendant a "psychopath" and telling jurors
to find him less valuable than the victim because the defendant is a convicted killer); see also
Humphries, 366 F.3d at 282-83 (arguing at length that the defendant has no value because he is
a killer); State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886,902 (Mo. 1995) (urging jurors to find the defendant
less valuable than the victim because the defendant is guilty of first degree murder).
190. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 337 (urging jurors to decrease the defendant's value for raping
two victims).
191. See id. (imploring jurors to decrease the defendant's value because the defendant
"stabs and stabs and kills and rapes and kidnaps").
192. See Humphries, 366 F.3d at 282-83 (encouraging jurors to further decrease the
defendant's value because the defendant broke the law at ages 13, 14, 15 and 17); see also State
v. Gallion, 654 N.W.2d 446, 454 n.4 (Wis. 2002) (noting that the sentencing authority in this
non-capital case further decreased the defendant's value because "as a younger man [the
defendant] was involved in a lot of criminal activity").
193. For an excerpt of a comparative value arguments that uses victim impact evidence in
this manner, see Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 211-13 (4th Cir. 2005).
194. See id. at 213 (arguing that the victim was valuable to society because the victim was
a spouse).
195. See id. (noting that the victim had a child).
196. See id. (stating that the victim was a self-made businessman).
197. See id. (arguing that the victim is valuable because the victim involved himself with
the community).
198. See State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. 1995) (describing the victim as the
innocent party).
199. See State v. Gallion, 654 N.W.2d 446, 454 n.4 (Wis. 2002) (adding value to the
victim because the victim came from a loving family).
200. See id. (noting that the victim graduated high school).
201. See id. (describing the victim as an outstanding citizen).
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nice decent person,2°2 a hard-working employee,20 3 a religious individual,2 °4 or
a law abiding citizen. 20 5 Further, the victim's character is rarely attacked by
defendants. 206 Therefore, in the majority of cases, jurors assess the victim's
social value by using unchallenged evidence of the victim's good character.
3. Risk of Arbitrary Sentencing
The previous sections discussed the broad differences between the analysis
required by law and comparative value analysis. This section argues that there
are specific differences between the two types of analysis that create the risk of
arbitrary sentencing. First, jurors influenced by these arguments misuse victim
impact evidence. Second, jurors use mitigation evidence in a manner that the
Constitution forbids. Finally, due to changes in the analysis that jurors use,
they are less likely to treat their roles seriously.
a. Jurors Might Misuse Victim Impact Evidence
Jurors influenced by comparative value arguments improperly use victim
impact evidence. The Court permits jurors to use victim impact evidence to
assess "the specific harm caused by the crime."207 In other words, jurors may
consider victim impact evidence in assessing the prosecutor's case for death.208
The presentation of victim impact evidence does not, however, replace the
requirement that prosecutors establish an aggravating factor.209  Even as
recognized in Payne, prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least
one aggravating factor independent of the existence of victim impact
202. See State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 179 (N.J. 2001) (describing the victim as a
nice, decent person).
203. See id. at 182 (noting that the victim was a hard-working individual).
204. See id. (stating that the victim was religious).
205. See id. (encouraging jurors to increase the victim's value because the victim was law
abiding).
206. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (summarizing the many reasons
why defendants do not attack the character of the victims).
207. See id. at 825-27 (describing the uses to which jurors may put victim impact
evidence).
208. Cf. id. (holding that victim impact evidence helps prosecutors to counteract the
defendant's ability to present unlimited mitigation evidence).
209. See id. (discussing the potential uses of victim impact evidence, which do not include
the ability to use victim impact evidence as an aggravating factor).
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evidence.21 ° If jurors find that the prosecutor established this factor, they then
may consider mitigation and victim impact evidence.21 Further, sentencing
statutes do not permit victim impact evidence as a substitute for proof of
aggravating factors.2 12 Therefore, the death penalty cannot be imposed solely
because victim impact evidence is admitted.213
Yet under comparative value analysis, the entire life-or-death decision
turns on the admission of victim impact evidence.2 14 This problem is visible
when the steps of comparative value analysis are explored and probable jury
resolutions considered. First, the defendant's value is set at zero, or close to
it.215 Second, jurors likely set the victim's value quite high.216 As previously
noted, prosecutors give jurors a thorough accounting of the victim's good deeds
or value to society.2 17 However, even in a case with minimal good character
evidence presented, jurors add some points to the victim's value. 21 8 The
victim's value may be increased because the victim did not harm the defendant
and thus, the victim has some value to society beyond that of the defendant.
219
Thus, as a starting point, the victim's value is higher than the defendant's.
It is during the final step-balancing the two values to determine whose
life is worth more-that the effects of comparative value analysis are most
pronounced.22 ° Under comparative value analysis, jurors will always sentence
210. See Logan, supra note 14, at 180 (stating that victim impact evidence is not a
substitute for aggravating factors).
211. See id. (describing the analysis that the law requires as first requiring jurors to find the
existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, second requiring
consideration of mitigation evidence, and last, requiring consideration of any victim impact
evidence that might counteract the defendant's mitigation case).
212. See NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 170, at 69-97 (noting that aggravating factors are
a requirement to be established independent of any admitted victim impact evidence).
213. See State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. 1995) (holding that aggravating
factors must permit jurors to distinguish between different defendants and that victim impact
evidence cannot serve as an aggravating factor because jurors cannot distinguish between one
defendant and another on this ground).
214. See id. (holding that jurors using comparative worth analysis treat this evidence as an
aggravating factor).
215. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing setting the defendant's value).
216. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing setting the victim's value).
217. See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (noting that prosecutors present
jurors with evidence of the victim's good deeds and qualities).
218. Cf. State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 182 (N.J. 2001) (stating that even if the victim
impact evidence is not strong, jurors will still find more value in the victim because the victim is
the victim, the defendant, the victim's murderer).
219. See id. (noting that victims have some value simply because they are the victim and
not the murderer).
220. See, e.g., Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335,340-41 (S.C. 2004) (describing comparative
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the defendant to death. 221 This result occurs especially in cases in which
prosecutors extolled the victim's good virtues during arguments.222 In these
cases, jurors have plenty of facts to use to boost the victim's value. Moreover,
this result occurs in every case in which victim impact evidence is admitted.223
Even minimal victim impact evidence will cause a noticeable disparity between
the values of the victim and the defendant. The imposition of death based on
the finding of an aggravating factor is transformed into the imposition of death
based on the admission of victim impact evidence.224
This use of victim impact evidence differs from the way that the law
requires jurors to use it. When prosecutors make permissible arguments with
victim impact evidence, they encourage jurors to use it to assess the impact of
the crime on the victims and their families.225 Opinions addressing comparative
worth arguments found these arguments distinguishable from the permissible
uses. 226 Through comparative worth arguments, prosecutors seek to comer
jurors into a death verdict if jurors give any consideration of victim impact
227evidence. This use of victim impact evidence taints the sentencing processwith arbitrariness. 228
worth as the balancing of the relative worth of the defendant against the victim in order to
determine the appropriate sentence).
221. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (stating that jurors who use comparative worth balancing
will never reach any result but that the death penalty is appropriate); Koskovich, 776 A.2d at
182 (stating that comparative value balancing usually results in a death verdict).
222. See Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (noting that the prosecutor presented evidence of the
victim's good qualities and that, especially in cases like these, jurors are inclined to impose
death instead of life).
223. See id. (stating that when victim impact evidence is admitted, jurors using
comparative value balancing tend to impose death verdicts); see also Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341
(stating that the admission of victim impact evidence results in a death verdict).
224. Cf. State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886,902 (Mo. 1995) (holding unconstitutional the use
of victim impact evidence as the aggravating factor).
225. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (stating that victim impact evidence is used properly
when it is used to demonstrate the impact of the crime on the victims and the victims' loved
ones).
226. See id. (distinguishing comparative value arguments as an impermissible use of victim
impact evidence); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 179 (1996) (distinguishing comparative
value arguments from the permissible uses of victim impact evidence).
227. See Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004) (holding that jurors using victim
impact evidence as directed by comparative value arguments can reach no verdict but death); see
also State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 182 (N.J. 2001) (stating that jurors who use comparative
value analysis tend to render death verdicts, and thus victim impact evidence operates as the
aggravating factor).
228. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 340-41 (holding that comparative worth arguments infect
capital sentencing with arbitrariness); see also Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (N.J. 2001) (holding
that comparative value arguments increase the risk that jurors will arbitrarily impose the death
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Under Caldwell, prosecutors cannot urge jurors to misuse evidence during
deliberation. 229 The courts that prohibit comparative value arguments did not
ground their holdings in Caldwell analysis. Their holdings do, however,
establish each element of a Caldwell violation. Prosecutors urged jurors to use
victim impact evidence in a manner230 that conflicts with the constitutionally
permissible uses of victim impact evidence. 231 Arguments of this type create
the risk of an arbitrarily imposed death sentence.232
b. Jurors Might Misuse Mitigation Evidence
Additionally, jurors influenced by comparative value arguments
improperly use mitigation evidence. The law requires jurors to give
consideration to the defendant's mitigation evidence. 33 Mitigation evidence
takes many forms.234 Defendants present evidence of their good character and
good deeds.235 They present this evidence with hopes of persuading jurors to
sentence).
229. See supra Part III.B (discussing Caldwell violations and noting that prosecutors
cannot misdirect jurors on their use of evidence during jury deliberations).
230. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d 266, 270 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
prosecutor encouraged jurors to use comparative value analysis); Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341
(stating that the prosecutor's argument encouraged the jurors to balance worth); Koskovich, 776
A.2d at 182 (holding that the jury instructions encouraged the jurors to render a verdict based on
the comparative worth of the defendant and the victim).
231. See Humphries, 366 F.3d at 270 (stating that the victim impact evidence was used in a
comparative life analysis, which is more than Payne allows); Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (holding
victim impact evidence as used during comparative worth analysis as contrary to what the law
requires); Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (holding victim impact evidence as used in comparative
worth analysis an unconstitutional use of victim impact evidence).
232. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 340-41 (stating that the prosecutor mislead the jury on the
uses of victim impact evidence in a manner that infected the trial with an impermissible level of
arbitrariness); Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (holding that misleading jurors impermissibly
increased the risk of an arbitrary sentence).
233. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (holding that state
sentencing schemes cannot impose conditions that limit the jurors' consideration of mitigation
evidence); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (stating that jurors "may not refuse to
consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence"); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that defendants are entitled to the presentation and jury
consideration of mitigation evidence).
234. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 380 (describing mitigation evidence as any "aspect of a
defendant's character or record or a circumstance of the offense that the defendant proffered as a
basis for a sentence less than death").
235. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826 (1991) (noting that defendants present
evidence of their good qualities as part of their mitigation cases); Humphries v. Ozmint, 397
F.3d 206, 210 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that as part of his mitigation case, the defendant presented
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take mercy on them because, perhaps, they are not the worst of the worst.
23 6
Additionally, defendants present evidence of any diagnosed mental
237 23239deficiencies, untreated mental deficiencies, 8 below average intelligence,
240 242lack of education, 24° poor physical health,241 history of substance abuse, and
traumatic or troubled upbringings.243 They introduce the latter category of
evidence to show that there are factors other than their bad character alone that
have led to the crime committed. 2" Consideration of this kind of mitigation
evidence has led some juries to render life sentences instead of death.245
Indeed, Humphries and other defendants in the comparative value cases
presented evidence of their troubled lives for this purpose.246 Thus, the law
requires jurors to consider both kinds of mitigation evidence and to use both in
a manner that is favorable to the defendant.
evidence showing the jurors that he is a "trustworthy, respectful, and pleasant person").
236. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 968 (2005) (noting that defendants present
mitigation evidence to persuade juries to impose a sentence less than death).
237. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 370 n.1 (stating that the defendant presented evidence of
"minimal brain damage").
238. See McKoy, 494 U.S. at 437 (stating that the defendant presented evidence of several
decades of mental and emotional problems that went untreated); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 107 (1982) (noting that the defendant presented a psychologist who told the jurors that the
defendant suffered from "sociopathic or antisocial personality").
239. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,436 (1990) (reviewing evidence that the
defendant presented showing his "borderline intellectual" capabilities); Eddings, 455 U.S. at
107 (noting that the defendant presented evidence that he had below average mental and
emotional development for boys of his age).
240. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 370 n.1 (1988) (stating that the defendant
presented evidence of his sixth grade education).
241. See McKoy, 494 U.S. at 437 (noting that the defendant presented evidence of poor
physical health).
242. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 370 n.1 (noting that the defendant informed jurors that he
developed drug and alcohol problems at a young age).
243. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 107 (discussing the mitigation evidence presented by the
defendant as including evidence of his parents' divorce, his mother's alcohol abuse and possible
prostitution, and his father's infliction of severe physical punishments).
244. See id. at 115-16 (discussing this type of mitigation evidence and noting that jurors
might find defendants less culpable upon consideration of it).
245. See id. (noting that jurors might take mercy upon a defendant with a "turbulent"
upbringing).
246. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 210 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
defendant presented evidence of his "extensive history of emotional, physical, and substance
abuse" problems); Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 337 (S.C. 2004) (stating that the defendant
presented as part of his mitigation case, evidence of his "battle with epilepsy, diagnosed mental
deficiencies, his low IQ, and that he is borderline mentally retarded"); State v. Storey, 901
S.W.2d 886, 901 (Mo. 1995) (noting that the defendant presented evidence of his abusive
family as part of his mitigation case).
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Under comparative value analysis, jurors use some but not all mitigation
evidence as evidence that favors a life sentence. Mitigation evidence, if
considered, falls on the "defendant's value" side of the equation. 247 The
consideration of mitigation evidence of the defendant's good deeds, if
considered, should result in the addition of points to the defendant's value.248
Under comparative value analysis, the higher the defendant's value, the better
the defendant's chance is for life. 249 Therefore, to the extent that jurors treat
evidence of the defendant's good deeds as value added to society jurors use this
form of mitigation evidence in the manner required by the Constitution-
evidence demonstrative of why the defendant should receive a punishment less
than death.
Not all mitigation evidence, however, receives the same treatment under
both types of analysis. It is the latter category of evidence-evidence of the
defendant's troubled life-that is misused. It is uncertain whether this type of
evidence can be described as demonstrating value added to society. Does the
fact that the defendant went for decades without treatment for psychological
problems show that he adds value to society?250 What about a defendant with
below average intelligence who suffered for years at the hands of an abusive
parent?251 More likely than not, jurors do not consider these facts as indicative
of contributions to society.
Regardless of whether these individuals are considered burdens to society,
it is unlikely that they are considered contributors to society.252 At best, jurors
ignore this mitigation evidence in setting the defendant's value. Moreover, to
247. Cf State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 182 (N.J. 2001) (discussing the probable
comparative worth analysis conducted by jurors, and noting that only victim impact evidence of
the victim's good qualities is used by jurors to assess the victim's value).
248. The author asserts this proposition with the assumption that jurors will treat evidence
of good deeds of the defendant the same as they are urged to treat evidence of good deeds of the
victim-value added to society. Cf id. (discussing probable comparative value analysis and
noting that evidence of the victim's good deeds and good character demonstrate value added to
society).
249. Cf Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (describing comparative value analysis as determining
the defendant's sentence by his value to society-if it is higher than the victim's, the defendant
will receive a life sentence).
250. For the case upon which this question is based, see McKoy v. Maryland, 494 U.S.
433, 437 (1990) (noting that the defendant presented this evidence as part of his mitigation
case).
251. For the case upon which this question is based, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 107 (1982) (stating that the defendant submitted this evidence as part of his mitigation
case).
252. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,823-24 (1991) (noting that an individual with
mental defects is "not, in the eyes of most, a significant contributor to society").
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the extent that contemporary society considers these individuals a burden,
jurors will use this evidence to decrease the defendant's value. By treating this
evidence as either irrelevant to setting the defendant's value or indicative of the
defendant's lack of value, jurors are not using this evidence as the Constitution
requires. They use it to increase the defendant's probability of receiving a
death sentence. It is precisely this use of mitigation evidence that the
Constitution forbids.253
Arguments that create the risk thatjurors will misuse mitigation evidence
violate Caldwell.254 Again, courts have not explicitly addressed this danger as a
ground for prohibiting these arguments. Yet, this very real danger exists so
long as courts permit prosecutors to make comparative value arguments.
c. Jurors Might Treat Their Role Less Seriously
These previous sections demonstrate that comparative value analysis and
the analysis required by law are not the same. This difference is not unnoticed
by courts.255 First, several opinions distinguish between the consideration of
aggravating and mitigating factors and the weighing of lives as entirely
different methods of analysis.256 The analysis required by law involves
evaluating the circumstances of the crime and the defendant's criminal
propensity and issuing a death sentence if this evidence is not counteracted by
sufficient mitigating circumstances.257 The weighing of lives involves
253. See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-15 (holding that defendants are entitled to the
jurors' consideration of evidence of their troubled lives because this consideration might lead
the jurors to conclude that life, not death, is the appropriate punishment).
254. See supra Part III.B (discussing Caldwell violations and noting that prosecutors
cannot misdirect jurors on their required consideration of mitigation evidence).
255. See Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335,341 (S.C. 2004) (distinguishing comparative worth
analysis as "totally unrelated" to the analysis required by law); State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d
144, 182 (N.J. 2001) (distinguishing comparative value analysis from the analysis required by
law); State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. 1995) (discussing the differences between
comparative value analysis and the analysis required by law); cf Humphries v. Ozmint, 397
F.3d 206, 208-14 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting the difference between the analysis that the prosecutor
in Hall requested jurors to use and what the law requires).
256. See Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 180-82 (holding that jurors must apply the law while
deliberating and that deliberations based on comparative worth analysis are not the same);
Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902 (holding that comparative value analysis is not the same as
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors).
257. See Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 180-81 (noting that the law requires jurors to follow
certain standards during deliberations and later referencing the aggravation-mitigation
framework); Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902 (recognizing consideration of aggravating and
mitigating factors as the analysis that jurors must use).
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evaluating evidence of two biographies and issuing a verdict of death if the
defendant's life is worth less.258 A death sentence should represent punishment
for "the legal wrong a citizen has committed." 259 Instead, death is a punishment




One result of jurors deviating from the analysis required by law is the risk
that they might treat their role in the capital sentencing system differently.
261
Through use of comparative value analysis, jurors cease serving as decision
262makers who follow specific legal standards. Instead, they serve as judges of
character and of status.263 Operating under this new role, jurors likely treat
their task as easier than it is.264 Determining "who lived the better life" does not
involve any legal analysis.265 Instead, a decision made using this criterion
simply involves placing a few facts about the defendant's life on one side of an
266equation, and a few facts about the victim's on the other.2 6 The making of a
legal decision, however, involves much more on the part of the jurors. 267 Jurors
258. Cf Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (stating that comparative value analysis involves
assigning value to the defendant's and victim's lives and rendering a death sentence if the
defendant's life is worth less).
259. Humphries, 397 F.3d at 246 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
260. See id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (stating that comparative value analysis results in
the infliction of the death penalty on the basis of social status).
261. Cf supra Part II.B (discussing Caldwell violations and noting that when jurors are
led to use analysis that varies from that required by law, they treat their role differently).
262. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 236 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that jurors
using comparative value analysis do not consider the "circumstances of the crime, the
consequences for its victims, and the defendant's criminal history," factors that the law requires
them to consider); State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. 1995) (stating that jurors using
comparative value analysis do not consider aggravating and mitigating factors, as required by
sentencing statutes).
263. See Humphries, 397 F.3d at 246 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (describing jurors using
comparative value analysis as judges of social status).
264. See Storey, 901 S.W. 2d at 902 (stating that comparative value arguments are
prejudicial because they result in jurors thinking that their job is simpler than what the law
requires).
265. Cf. id. (stating that comparative value analysis permits jurors to "lump" all defendants
into one category for punishment purposes, making analysis of legal standards, such as
aggravating factors, irrelevant to their decision making process); see also Hall, 601 S.E.2d at
341 (stating that jurors who use comparative value analysis "conduct an arbitrary balancing of
worth" that is "totally unrelated to the circumstances of the crime," meaning the factors the law
requires jurors to consider); State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 182 (N.J. 2001) (describing
comparative value analysis as character balancing, and thus, void of legal analysis).
266. See Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (stating that the hypothetical comparative value
analysis in this case involved jurors placing on the victim's side facts that the victim was "hard-
working, religious, [and] law abiding," and on the defendant's side, that the defendant was a
"convicted murderer").
267. See Humphries, 397 F.3d at 245 (detailing all of the factors that jurors must consider
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must evaluate the persuasiveness of the evidence presented.268 They must
support each of their legal findings with facts. 26 9 They must consider the
aggravating factors listed in sentencing statutes and whether the prosecutor
established one beyond a reasonable doubt.270 The distinctions between these
two types of analysis as discussed by courts indicate that the courts consider
comparative value analysis to be simpler and less methodical than the analysis
required by law.27 1 It is not a stretch to imagine that jurors minimize the
importance of their role.
Under Caldwell, however, prosecutors are prohibited from encouraging
jurors to minimize the importance of their role.272 None of the courts that
prohibit comparative value analysis grounded their holdings in this analysis.
Yet the elements necessary to establish a Caldwell violation are found in their
holdings. Prosecutors discuss one version of the role of jurors in the capital
sentencing system,273 while the law requires a different role of them.274 This
misinformation results in the imposition of an arbitrary death sentence 275 and
violates the Eighth Amendment's reliability requirement.276
when using the analysis required by law).
268. Cf. Koskovich, 776 A.2d at 182 (implying that jurors using comparative value analysis
ignore the determinate facts of the case and the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's and
defendant's cases).
269. Cf. id. (implying that jurors using comparative value analysis ignore this duty).
270. See, e.g., State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886,902 (Mo. 1995) (indicating that jurors who
use the analysis required by law consider statutory aggravating factors in making their decision).
271. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206,249 (4th Cir. 2005)(describing the analysis
required by law as more of a methodical nature, and comparative value analysis a free-for-all);
Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902 (stating that comparative worth arguments simplify the analysis
involved in deliberating a death sentence, when the decision actually involves consideration of a
"wide array" of legal factors).
272. See supra Part I.B (discussing Caldwell violations and noting that prosecutors
cannot misdirect jurors on the importance of their role in the capital sentencing system).
273. See, e.g., Humphries, 397 F.3d 206,248-49(4th Cir. 2005)(Willdnson, J., dissenting)
(holding that comparative value arguments encourage jurors to consider themselves status
judges).
274. See, e.g., id. at 245 (noting that the law requires jurors to punish defendants for
committing crimes and comparative value arguments direct jurors to punish defendants for
"leading a less valuable life than someone else").
275. See, e.g., Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004) (stating that comparative
value analysis results in the arbitrary imposition of death).
276. The author recognizes that not all courts treat comparative value arguments as having
a significant effect on jurors. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing opinions
that permit comparative value arguments). However, these opinions represent the minority
view. There is a growing consensus against the use of comparative value arguments because of
the effect that these arguments have on jurors. See supra note 146 and accompanying text
(indicating that the majority of capital sentencing jurisdictions that have addressed fully the
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C. Comparative Value Arguments as Due Process Clause Violations
Finally, there is a due process doctrine (aside from the Court's prohibition
on unconstitutionally misleading arguments) that supports a finding that
comparative value arguments are unconstitutional-the Court's prohibition on
inflammatory arguments. Prosecutors are prohibited from making arguments
that might inflame the jurors.277 The law requires decisions made on reason
and application of the law to the facts, not passion and prejudice.2 78 One of the
reasons Booth held the presentation of victim impact evidence unconstitutional
is because the admission of this evidence might lead to arguments by
prosecutors that inflame the jurors. 279 Booth feared that introduction of victim
impact evidence would lead to arguments by prosecutors that involved victim-
to-victim comparisons. 280 These comparisons, held Booth, deprive the jurors of
any "principled way" to make their sentencing decision.2 8' It is inflammatory to
ask jurors to render a death verdict because the particular victim of the case is a
"sterling member of the community rather than someone of questionable
character., 282 Because the Court believed that introducing victim impact
evidence would cause sentencing by passion, it barred the use of victim impact
evidence.283
merits of these arguments prohibit them as highly prejudicial to defendants). Further, the only
federal opinion to address these arguments appears to acknowledge their questionable
constitutional nature. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (noting that the Fourth
Circuit did not hold comparative value arguments constitutional). Thus, the author, too,
considers comparative value arguments highly persuasive. The analysis of this Note proceeds
upon this assumption.
277. See supra Part III.C (discussing the Clause and its prohibition against inflammatory
arguments).
278. See id. (noting that the law requires reasoned analysis from jurors and prohibits
decisions made on emotions).
279. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987) (stating that "the formal
presentation of [victim impact evidence] can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and
divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the
defendant").
280. See id. at 506 (prohibiting the admission of victim impact evidence because
prosecutors might use it for impermissible purposes, such as victim-to-victim comparisons
during closing arguments).
281. See id. (describing victim-to-victim comparisons as interjecting arbitrariness in capital
sentencing deliberations because these arguments leave jurors with no "principled way" to
determine which defendants should receive the death penalty).
282. See id. (describing this distinction as depriving jurors of principled decision making,
thereby leaving them subject to decision making on a whim, or out of passion).
283. See id. (holding the admission of victim impact evidence unconstitutional because its
admission will lead to inflammatory arguments that inject arbitrariness into sentencing
deliberations).
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When the Court overturned Booth in Payne, the Court did not leave
Booth's concern with inflammatory arguments unaddressed.284 Instead, the
Court provided a solution. 285 Payne expressed disapproval of any victim-to-
286victim comparisons. The Payne court believed that by eliminating these
inflammatory comparisons courts could permit the admission of victim impact
evidence without fear of any resulting arbitrary sentencing.287 In addressing
288Booth's concerns, the Court reconciled Payne with Booth. Thus, Payne did
not reject the concerns expressed in Booth as irrelevant to the permissible uses
of victim impact evidence.289
To the extent that Payne's disapproval of victim-to-victim comparisons is
premised on Booth's concern for inflammatory comparisons, there is no
difference between victim-to-victim comparisons and victim-to-defendant
comparisons. Both comparisons ask jurors to make their decision on the basis
of human worth. 290 Booth stated that asking jurors to make their decision on
291the basis of human worth is inflammatory by nature. Jurors will always side
with the individual who is more worthy. 292 "[O]ur system of justice, [however,]
does not tolerate such distinctions. ',293 Distinctions on the basis of human
284. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (acknowledging Booth's concern
with the arbitrariness that results from victim-to-victim comparisons as a use of victim impact
evidence).
285. See id. (resolving the concerns expressed in Booth).
286. See id. (holding that "victim impact evidence is not offered to encourage" comparisons
between "victims [who] were assets to their community... [and] victims [who] are perceived to
be less worthy"). There is some debate among the courts about the meaning of this passage;
however, all courts interpret this passage as prohibiting victim-to-victim comparisons. See
Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that Payne is understood
as prohibiting victim-to-victim comparisons).
287. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (stating that the admission of victim impact evidence does
not inject sentencing decisions with arbitrariness because this evidence is not used for
comparative purposes).
288. See id. (discouraging victim-to-victim comparisons as a use of victim impact
evidence, thereby reconciling Payne with the constitutional concerns expressed in Booth).
289. See id. (acknowledging but not criticizing the concerns expressed in Booth).
290. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 n.8 (1987) (describing victim-to-victim
comparisons as comparisons of perceived worth); cf Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335,341 (S.C.
2004) (describing comparative worth arguments as comparisons of human worth).
291. Cf. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 n.8 (expressing concern for using human worth as the basis
for sentencing determinations because these considerations inflame jurors, thereby violating
fundamental fairness standards).
292. Cf. id. at 506 (expressing concern over human worth comparisons because these
comparisons turn on the jurors' perception of which individual has greater worth).
293. See id. at 506 n.8 (describing principles fundamental to the American legal system).
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worth do not result in decisions made on the basis of sound reasoning.294 Both
comparisons deprive jurors of the ability to make their decision in a principled
manner.295 Because victim-to-defendant comparisons are just as inflammatory
as victim-to-victim comparisons, they, too, mislead jurors.296 The jurors' focus
shifts from consideration of the law and facts to passion and prejudice.297
Encouraging this shift violates the Due Process Clauses.298
V. Conclusion
It is ironic that comparative value arguments emerged as one of the uses of
victim impact evidence. The majority in Payne believed that the per se ban on
the admission of victim impact evidence unfairly disadvantaged prosecutors at
capital sentencing proceedings. 299  Defendants had the ability to present
unlimited mitigation evidence of their individuality. Yet prosecutors could not
counter this emotional evidence with evidence showing the victim's
uniqueness. 300 The majority viewed lifting the per se ban as tipping the
"unfairly weighted... scales" back into balance. 30 1 However, by providing a
294. See id. at 506 (noting that arguments that encourage jurors to make human worth
distinctions mislead jurors into making unprincipled decisions).
295. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (holding comparative worth arguments so "emotionally
inflammatory that [they become] a material part of the jury's deliberation process"); State v.
Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. 1995) (holding that comparative worth arguments encourage
decisions grounded in "bias or caprice" instead of neutral and principled reasoning).
296. See Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004) (holding that comparative worth
arguments mislead jurors by encouraging decisions premised on emotion rather than
consideration of the circumstances of the crime); Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902 (holding that
comparative worth arguments mislead jurors by inflaming them).
297. See Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (holding that comparative worth arguments mislead jurors
by materially altering their decision making process from one premised in legal standards to one
influenced by passion); Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902 (holding that comparative worth arguments
encourage jurors to make decisions based on passion and discourage jurors from making
decisions based on legal principles).
298. Cf. Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341 (holding that comparative worth arguments misdirect
jurors, resulting in a Due Process Clause violation); Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902 (holding that
comparative worth arguments misdirect jurors, thereby violating the Due Process Clause).
299. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (stating that the per se ban on the
presentation of victim impact evidence "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial").
300. See id. (discussing the defendant's ability to submit unlimited mitigation evidence and
the state's inability to counter this evidence with any evidence of the victim's uniqueness).
301. See id. (lifting the per se ban in order to level the playing field between defendant and
prosecutor).
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vague limitation on its uses, Payne permits prosecutors to do more than just
level the playing field.302
This Note argues that comparative value arguments are one example of
prosecutors using victim impact evidence to tip the scales entirely in their
favor.303 These persuasive arguments mislead jurors in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and Due Process Clauses. 304 To date, courts have paid too little
attention to these arguments. Barely over a handful of state supreme courts
have resolved challenges to the use of comparative value arguments. 0 5
Further, in Humphries-the only federal opinion to acknowledge their
questionable validity-the circuit was constrained by the exceptionally narrow
review permitted under the federal habeas statute.306 This Note concludes that
until the Supreme Court prohibits the use of comparative value arguments, the
Court's goal of a level playing field will remain unrealized.
302. See Logan, supra note 14, at 191-92 (arguing that Payne's vague limitation on the
uses of victim impact evidence permits highly prejudicial abuses by prosecutors).
303. See supra Part IV (arguing that these persuasive arguments wrongly compel a death
verdict).
304. See supra Part IV (arguing that comparative value arguments violate the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clauses by misleading the jurors).
305. See supra Part IV (noting that only seven states have addressed challenges to these
arguments).
306. See supra Part IV (discussing the standard of review issues that deprived the
defendant of full consideration of constitutional challenges to comparative value arguments).
